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The	Cosmopolitics	of	Situated	Care	
Michael	Schillmeier	
			
Abstract	
The	 everyday	 experiences	 of	 illness	 draw	 our	 attention	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 the	
cosmopolitics	of	care	in	which	‘normal/ized’	practices	of	care	can	neither	be	taking	for	
granted	nor	be	expected.	Drawing	on	ethnographies	of	illness	this	paper	argues	that	
caring	relations	demand	the	attentiveness	to	the	emerging	requirements	of	care	 in	
concrete	 situations.	 Shared	 policy	 rules	 are	 beneficial	 if	 they	 allow	 to	 respond	
adequately	to	the	unfolding	issues,	requirements	and	obligations	of	care	practices.	An	
ethnographic	 sense	 of	 and	 for	 caring	 practices	 may	 offer	 important	 insights	 to	
contribute	to	health	care	policy	making	processes.		
	
Introduction		
The	 everyday	 experiences	 of	 illness	 draw	 our	 attention	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 the	
cosmopolitics	of	care	in	which	‘normal/ized’	practices	of	care	can	neither	be	taking	for	
granted	nor	be	expected.1	Drawing	on	ethnographies	of	illness	this	paper	argues	that	
caring	relations	demand	the	attentiveness	to	the	emerging	requirements	of	care	 in	
concrete	 situations.	 Shared	 policy	 rules	 are	 beneficial	 if	 they	 allow	 to	 respond	
adequately	to	the	unfolding	issues,	requirements	and	obligations	of	care	practices.	An	
ethnographic	 sense	 of	 and	 for	 caring	 practices	 may	 offer	 important	 insights	 to	
																																								 																				
1	On	the	notion	of	‚cosmopolitics’	as	explored	here,	see	Schillmeier	(2013,	2014)	and	Stengers	(2005,	
2010).		
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contribute	to	health	care	policy	making	processes	which	aim	to	avoid	the	fallacy	of	
mistaking	the	abstract	for	the	concrete	issues	of	situated	care	practices.		
Caring	practices	easily	unfold	the	bifurcation	of	care:	those	who	care	and	those	who	
need	care.	The	history	of	the	Western	Judea-Christian	tradition	of	policing	care	(as	
well	 as	 the	 medical	 gaze)	 undoubtedly	 contributed	 –	 wittingly	 or	 not	 –	 to	 the	
bifurcation	 of	 care,	 rendering	 those	 in	 need	 of	 care	 as	 victims	 of	 bad	 fate,	 as	
dependent,	passive,	 lacking	autonomy,	choice	and	discretion,	suffering	 from	an	 ‘ill’	
situation	that	is	beyond	what	is	considered	as	‘normal’	and	thus	‘healthy’	(Foucault,	
2009;	 Schillmeier,	 2014).	 The	 history	 of	 policing	 care	 then	 is	 also	 the	 history	 of	
di/visioning	 the	 normal	 from	 the	 pathological,	 health	 from	 illness,	 ability	 from	
disability	and	configuring	thereby	the	historical	multiplicity	of	the	societal	other	and	
his/her	‘troublesome’	life-worlds	(cf.	Borsay,	2005).		
	
Care	studies	critically	assess	the	bifurcation	of	care	by	addressing	the	specificities	of	
caring	relations	in	situ	(cf.	Barnes	et	al.,	2015;	Latimer,	2000;	Mol,	2008;	Mol,	Moser	
and	Pols,	2010).	These	studies	highlight	 that	care	 is	not	generally	divided	between	
carers	and	those	cared	for,	but	distributed	between	the	different	actors	involved.	This	
includes	 the	 person	 experiencing	 illness	 or	 disability	 as	 central	 agents	 of	 care	
(Schillmeier,	2014).	As	Mol’s	‘logic	of	care’	(Mol,	2008)2	argues,	caring	practices	extend	
the	 agencies	 of	 care	 to	 the	 non-human.	 Accordingly,	 it	 would	 appear	 similarily	
problematic	to	bifurcate	between	care	as	the	emotional	warmth	of	humanness	and	
																																								 																				
2	Mol	contrasts	the	logic	of	care	with	the	logic	of	choice.		With	Mol	I	share	some	uneasiness	with	the	
current	discourse	of	‚patient	choice’.	On	patient	choice	as	part	of	health	care	policy	advocating	the	idea	
of	‚personalized	medicine’,	see	Schillmeier	(2017).		
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the	 cold,	 rationalizing	 technology	 that	 is	 prone	 to	 endanger	 and	 contradict	 the	
requirements	and	practices	of	care.	As	ethnographic	care	studies	highlight,	technology	
plays	 a	 crucial,	 but	 nevertheless	 ambiguous,	 role	 in	 everyday	 care	 practices	 (cf.	
Schillmeier,	 2014;	 Mol,	 Moser	 and	 Pols,	 2010).	 As	 a	 collective	 achievement	 of	
affective,	embodied	and	material	relations	between	humans	as	well	as	humans	and	
non-humans,	 care	 refers	 to	 practices	 of	 attention	 given	 to	 an	 unfolding	 relational	
situation	of	requirements	and	obligations	that	need	to	be	addressed	in	situ	to	live	well	
with	and	in	it.		
	
Current	issues	of	health	care	policies	in	ageing	societies	pose	novel	and	demanding	
questions	concerning	the	affordability	and	the	limits	of	institutionalized	forms	of	care	
(Harper	and	Hamblin,	2016;	Lloyd,	2012;	Milligan,	2009;	Schillmeier	and	Domenèch,	
2010;	Weicht,	2015).	Social	change	has	proven	to	be	a	source	 for	controversies	by	
which	 the	 different	 understandings	 of	 what	 counts	 as	 ‘good	 care’,	 and	 what	 is	
necessary	for	it	and	what	can	be	expected	from	specific	‘matters	of	care’	(Puig	de	la	
Bellacasa,	2011),	becomes	visible.	Caring	relations	about	health	are	exposed	to	and	
affected	by	the	demands,	possibilities	and	restrictions	of	the	national	or	organisational	
budget,	 the	 dependency	 on	 different	 forms	 of	 (political)	 governance	 and	 their	
transformations,	 the	 impact	 of	 techno-scientific	 development,	 juridical	 questions,	
issues	 of	 management,	 organisational	 obstacles	 and	 institutionalised	 procedures,	
religious	views,	the	outlook	of	professional	training	for	carers,	the	effects	of	cultural	
differences	and	so	on.	Reflecting	 these	changes,	 the	policing	of	 care	mirrors	wider	
socio-cultural	and	political	realities,	which	contribute	to	the	need	or	dismissal	of	care,	
the	conditions	of	possibility	of	how	care	is	conducted,	who	is	involved	in	the	process	
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of	 care,	how	care	 is	 valued	and	how	caring	 relations	are	understood	and	assessed	
(Barnes	et	al.,	2015).		
	
These	multifactorial	societal	dependencies	and	changes	may	not	only	have	improving	
effects	 on	 care	 practices,	 but	 quite	 often	 fall	 foul	 with	 or	 even	 put	 at	 risk	 the	
requirements	and	obligations	of	the	caring	relations	 in	situ	and	harm	its	vulnerable	
actors	–	 inside	and	outside	of	 institutionalised	forms	of	health	care	(Bartlett,	1999;	
Francis,	2013).	Ethnographies	of	care	have	shown	that	neo-liberal	economies	of	care	
are	 frequently	 at	 odds	 with	 attentiveness,	 flexibility,	 patience,	 empathy,	 skilful	
engagement,	time	demanding	practices	needed	to	address	the	specific	and	changing	
requirements	of	everyday	practices	of	care	(Heinlein,	2003;	Latimer,	2000;	Schweiger,	
2011).	The	neo-liberal	economy	evokes	a	clash	between	the	demands	of	situated	care	
practices	 and	 (the	 promises	 and	 regulations	 of)	 economically	 driven	 health	 care	
policies.		
	
Care	relations	often	become	the	 locus	of	the	enactment	of	these	discrepancies.	To	
name	a	persistent	concern	in	health	care	practices:	Next	to	many	other	issues,	the	lack	
of	time	to	engage	sensibly	with	emerging	situations	in	the	conduct	of	everyday	care	
practices	names	a	 long-standing,	significant	and	often	unsolvable	problem	for	neo-
liberal	health	care	systems.	As	Schweiger	has	put	it:	Carers	do	have	patience,	but	do	
not	have	the	time	for	it.	She	shows	that	the	lack	for	caring	time	became	most	apparent	
when	 the	 institutional	 settings	 of	 care	 practices	 (of	 a	 specific	 ward	 in	 Germany)	
changed	from	being	governed	by	a	Judea-Christian	regime	of	care	committed	to	the	
‘grace	of	charity’	towards	a	more	business-oriented	model	of	care.	With	the	latter,	the	
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patient	 turned	 into	 a	 customer/client	 of	 a	 profit-oriented	 health	 care	 economy	
delivering	calculated	care	packages	(cf.	Tritter	et	al.,	2010).	All	too	often,	pre-given	
formats	of	how	much	care	should	be	delivered	and	how	much	time	can	be	afforded	
to	 do	 so,	 limit	 the	 time	 for	 the	 emergent	 requirements	 of	 care	 situations	 which	
frequently	 render	generalized	economies	of	quality	assessment	problematic	and	 in	
need	of	re-assessment	in	the	concrete	situation	(Schweiger,	2011).		
	
For	 the	 caring	 relationship,	 this	 conflict	 –	 of	 having	 patience	 without	 the	 time	 to	
realize	it	in	situations	that	would	require	so	–	recurrently	creates	stress	for	the	carers	
and	those	cared	for,	provokes	moral	dilemmas	and	evokes	rather	uncaring	situations.	
Situated	care	often	requires	flexible	engagement	to	the	shifting	requirements	of	care	
that	demand	patience	and	time	to	provide	and	experience	good	care.	The	problem	of	
having	patience	without	having	time	for	it	enforces	the	neglect	of	hesitation	of	what	
is	 ‘good’	or	 ‘bad’	 care	 in	practice	and	often	 results	 in	highly	 limited	possibilities	 to	
engage	a	good	caring	relation.	If	the	neglect	of	hesitation	is	inscribed	e.g.	in	abstract	
time	measurements	of	care	policies,	it	provokes	the	risk	to	structurally	dismiss	to	care	
for	the	emerging	cosmopolitics	of	situated	care.3		
	
Caring	for	the	Situation		
No	doubt,	 to	 improve	 care	 policy	 it	must	 become	more	 real,	 i.e.	 care	 policy	must	
become	more	sensitive	towards	the	cosmopolitics	of	care	that	allude	to	the	emerging	
requirements	 and	 obligations	 of	 situated	 care.	 This	 is	 not	 an	 easy	 task	 since	 the	
																																								 																				
3	On	hesitation	as	a	source	of	public	modes	of	caring	about	science,	technology	and	medicine,	see	
Schillmeier	(2015).				
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requirements	 and	 obligations	 of	 care	 unfold	 from	 an	 emerging	 situation	 that	
frequently	disrupts	what	is	considered	as	taken	for	granted,	routinized	and	normalized	
care	 practices,	 and	 consequently	 leaves	 open	 and	 put	 into	 question	 of	 how	 to	
adequately	engage	in	a	caring	relation	that	is	considered	good.	Health	care	policies	of	
care	remain	too	abstract	if	they	try	to	offer	a	framework	of	care	which	relies	on	the	
assumption	 that	 caring	 situations	 are	 primarily	 repetitive,	 comparable,	 hence	
measurable	and	standardisable.	Having	said	this,	routines	and	standards	are	always	
part	of	caring	practices,	but	become	caring	techniques	only	if	they	contribute	to	the	
situated	 requirements	 and	 obligations	 of	 care.	 Situations	 of	 care	 unpack	 the	
conditions	of	possibility	of	care	 in	the	first	place,	which	need	close	attention,	since	
they	often	do	not	provide	clear	and	fixed	solutions,	but	need	time	and	space	to	find	
out	what	is	required	to	accomplish	good	care	in	practice.		
What	becomes	apparent	in	emerging	situations	of	care	practices	as	well	as	in	ongoing	
attempts	to	revise	care	policies,	 is	 the	power	of	an	occurring	problematic	situation	
which	can’t	be	solved	along	mere	means	of	standardised	practices.	When	we	care,	we	
are	concerned	about	the	possibilities	of	care,	we	hesitate,	we	struggle,	we	tinker,	we	
pause,	we	concentrate,	we	mobilize	and	aim	at	skilful	action.	When	we	care,	we	are	
moved	 by	 a	 social	 problem	 enacted	 by	 the	 embodied	 eventfulness	 of	 everyday	
practices.	 ‘Care’,	as	 I	put	 it	elsewhere,	 ‘as	a	social	matter	of	concern	preserves	the	
possibilities	of	difference	as	an	on-going	collective	achievement’	(Schillmeier,	2014:	
102).	When	we	care,	we	are	affected	by	a	social	matter	of	concern	and	demands	that	
one	becomes	attuned	to	the	other	as	s/he	(and	it)	becomes	present	in	a	highly	specific	
and	often	vulnerable	and	unforeseeable	situation.	When	we	care,	we	care	about	the	
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fragility	of	embodied,	emotional	and	material	social	 interaction.	When	we	care,	we	
become	aware	that	we	live	with	and	for	others	on	speculative	terms,	which	can	easily	
turn	into	careless	practices.	With	care	comes	the	risk	of	being/becoming	careless.		
To	be	sure,	the	problem	of	care	-	initiated	by	hesitating	about	a	situation	that	requires	
a	 contrast	 to	 given	 routines	 -	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 previous	 solutions	 of	 similar	
situations	may	not	work.	Rather,	they	may	work,	but	the	same	solution	in	a	different	
situation	 may	 appear	 careless	 and	 possibly	 may	 do	 harm.	 Caring	 for	 emerging	
situations	 require	an	openness	concerning	 the	very	questions	of	what	 is	 cared	 for,	
how	to	care	and	who	cares.	To	foster	caring	relations,	the	policy	making	process	would	
do	good	to	give	space	and	time	to	engage	with	the	openness	of	what	a	situated	caring	
relation	requires	and	how	it	could	be	collectively	accomplished.	The	following	sections	
will	provide	some	insights	into	the	complexities	of	situated	care.		
	
Cosmopolitical	Events	and	Precarious	Selves		
This	is	the	story	of	Mr	B	who	has	been	suffering	from	two	strokes.4	After	the	second	
stroke	Mr	B	decided	to	move	into	a	caring	home	whereas	his	wife	remained	in	their	
apartment	(Schillmeier,	2014).	Mr	B’s	decision	to	move	 into	a	nursing	home,	so	he	
told	us5,	became	necessary	since	he	saw	himself	turning	into	a	burden	for	his	wife	who	
suffered	from	a	slipped	disk	when	helping	him	out	of	bed.	This	was	a	significant	issue	
																																								 																				
4	 Mr	 B	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 Schillmeier	 (2014).	 In	 the	 latter,	 I	 was	 trying	 to	 develop	 a	
cosmopolitical	understanding	of	experiencing	illness.	In	this	chapter,	I	will	briefly	re-narrate	the	story	
of	Mr	B	by	focussing	solely	on	the	question	of	situated	care.	
5	The	research	was	conducted	from	2000	to	2003	in	Germany	and	was	part	of	a	wider	research	project	
on	 ‘service	as	 interaction’	 (Anderson	&	Heinlein	2003;	Dunkel	&	Voß	2004),	 funded	by	 the	German	
Research	Foundation	(DFG;	No.	Vo	775/1-1).	Many	thanks	to	Michael	Heinlein,	see	also	Heinlein	(2003).	
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for	Mr	B.	Although	Mr	B	has	been	the	focus	of	daily	care,	it	was	of	most	importance	
for	him	to	be	able	to	care	for	his	wife,	even	if	it	means	to	leave	their	beloved	home	
and	move	into	a	nursing	home.	Relieving	Mrs	B	from	the	everyday	burden	of	caring	
for	him	remained	one	possibility	of	Mr	B	to	show	how	he	cares	about	the	well-being	
of	his	wife.	By	doing	so	he	felt	that	he	was	still	part	of	a	long-standing	caring	relation;	
he	felt	he	still	had	a	saying	and	could	positively	contribute	to	solve	a	caring	situation	
that	became	problematic	for	the	carers	(his	wife	and	a	nurse)	involved.		
Twenty	years	earlier.	Mr	B	was	61,	working	hard	and	successful	in	a	leading	position,	
when	he	followed	the	advice	of	his	doctor	to	retire.	To	care	more	about	his	body	than	
caring	about	his	work	wasn’t	a	voluntary	act,	he	said.	Mr	B	enjoyed	and	was	used	to	
organising	 things.	 He	 cared	 for	 his	 work,	 his	 colleagues	 and	 the	 company	 he	was	
working	for.	Facing	retirement	was	very	difficult.	Mr	B	needed	something	that	would	
keep	him	busy	working,	planning,	creating	and	developing,	although	in	a	more	private	
setting.	He	rediscovered	his	old	love	for	bees	and	beekeeping.	With	much	care	and	
effort,	he	developed	his	own	and	successful	apiculture.	Enjoying	the	work	with	bees	
and	 the	production	of	his	own	honey	contributed	 to	his	wellbeing	even	 though	he	
wasn’t	the	healthiest	person	any	more.		
Ten	 years	 after	 his	 retirement	 he	 suffered	 his	 first	 stroke.	 Mr	 B’s	 body	 required	
intensive	rehabilitation	to	slowly	ease	the	negative	effects	of	the	event.	Although	he	
recovered	well,	Mr	B	had	to	give	up	his	apiculture,	and	he	and	his	wife	moved	into	a	
new	flat.	Their	old	flat	became	problematic	since	it	was	in	the	third	floor	and	without	
elevator	access.	After	the	stroke,	Mr	B’s	life	had	changed	dramatically	again.	Caring	
about	 his	 professional	 apiculture	 proved	 impossible.	 Caring	 about	 his	 wellbeing	
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changed	as	well.	His	body	became	the	centre	of	his	care:	Daily	exercises,	avoiding	hard	
and	intensive	work,	and	additional	medical	treatments	were	needed	to	live	as	good	
as	possible	with	his	stroked	body.	To	engage	with	a	stroked	body	was	not	easy	and	
often	 required	 painful	 work,	 discipline	 and	 endurance.	 Professional	 help	 and	 the	
reliability	of	the	companionship	of	his	wife	stabilised	the	process	of	caring	––bodily,	
mentally	and	emotionally.	Rehabilitative	therapy	and	assistive	technologies	proved	to	
be	helpful	allies	in	Mr	B’s	post-stroke	life.	Assisted	by	a	walking	stick	and	keeping	with	
his	daily	exercises,	Mr	B	started	to	enjoy	life	more	than	ever	since	he	began	to	care	
about	his	life	without	professional	work	being	involved.	He	and	his	wife	also	enjoyed	
the	convenience	of	their	new	flat.	And	with	Mr	B	still	being	able	to	drive	on	his	own,	
they	frequently	went	on	holidays.	It	was	the	happiest	time	of	his	life,	he	said.		
Mr	B’s	shifting	caring	situations	revealed	that	bodily	events	like	a	stroke	(or	any	other	
serious	 illness)	 disrupt,	 question	 and	 alter	 the	 practices	 and	 routines	 of	 caring	 for	
oneself	and	others.	Undoubtedly,	caring	about	a	stroked	body	includes	the	experience	
of	pain,	sorrow	and	suffering,	the	ambiguities,	insecurities	and	indecisions,	and	may	
unleash	new	situations	of	care	which	alter	the	requirements	for	the	possibilities	of	
good	care	(Schillmeier,	2014).	An	event	like	a	stroke	unfolds	a	cosmopolitical	situation:	
affected	 by	 a	 stroke	 bodies	 experience	 an	 unexpected,	 emerging	 and	 disruptive	
situation	 for	 which	 novel	 caring	 practices	 are	 required.	 It	 requires	 a	 process	 of	
attentive	engagement	with	a	demanding	 situation	 that	may	 involve	many	ups	and	
downs,	 unexpected	 everyday	 life	 restrictions,	 disciplining	 bodies,	 enrolling	 others	
(humans,	 institutions,	 technologies),	 learning	 to	do	things	anew,	 to	give	up	 (doing)	
certain	things	and	so	on.		
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Caring	rarely	is	a	smooth	empirical	process.	What	we	have	seen	so	far	is	that	care	and	
its	requirements	are	not	only	shifting,	unpredictable	and	situational,	but	care	is	also	
biographical	 and	enacts	 the	different	modes	of	 caring	 in	highly	 idiosyncratic	ways.	
Care	creates	novel	interactions	and	in/dependencies.	Caring	practices	are	embodied,	
material	and	spatially	situated	as	well	as	they	re-assemble	the	past,	present	and	its	
possible	futures.	Mr	B’s	biography	of	care	–	be	it	self-care	and	the	care	for	him	and	
others	 –	 names	 a	 collective	 accomplishment,	 a	 social	 process	 of	 psychological,	
physical	and	emotional	 learning	 that	 re-relates	bodies,	materials	and	 technologies,	
ideas,	affects	and	feelings.		
Shifting	 situations	 of	 care	 implicate	 the	 experience	of	 human	beings	 as	precarious	
selves.	Precarious	selves	are	no	isolated	beings;	they	need	others	to	be/come	what	
they	are.	Moreover,	precarious	selves	may	also	experience	bodies	and	minds	that	act	
other	than	expected.	Experiencing	an	event	like	a	stroke,	bodies	resist	complying	with	
what	has	been	the	taken	for	granted	and	limit	what	contributed	to	their	well-being.	
With	 the	 advent	 of	 cosmopolitical	 events	 like	 a	 stroke,	 the	 pragmatics	 of	 caring	
relations	 change	 significantly	 ––	 within	 and/or	 between	 bodies	 and	 their	
environments.	 Bodies	 and	 minds	 become	 affected	 by,	 relate,	 interact	 with	 and	
become	dependent	on	others	 in	 different	ways	 than	 they	 are	used	 to	be.	 Stroked	
bodies	often	suffer,	become	less	mobile	and	agile,	are	in	pain,	become	‘unreliable’	or	
become	a	concern	in	the	way	one	cares	about	them	and	how	one	can	care	for	others.	
Depending	of	the	effects	of	event,	stroked	bodies	‘seem	to	be	or	become	[more	or	
less,	MS]	unknowing’	(Latimer	2009:	4).		
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To	look	at	caring	relations	as	shifting	and	situated	reveals	that	caring	about	one’s	body	
is	to	learn	to	have	a	body	through	embodied	and	material	relations	in	multiple	ways.	
As	Latour	(2004:	2)	reminds	us:	 ‘to	have	a	body	is	to	learn	to	be	affected,	meaning	
“effectuated”,	moved,	put	 into	motion	by	other	entities,	humans	or	nonhumans.	 If	
you	are	not	engaged	in	this	learning	you	become	insensitive,	dumb,	you	drop	dead’.		
Caring	trajectories	reveal	indeed,	as	Spinoza	suggested,	that	we	don’t	know	what	a	
body	 is	capable	of	 (cf.	Deleuze	1992:	Ch.	14).	 It	may	be	good	or	bad.	Good	care	 in	
practice,	though,	aims	at	keeping	and	strengthening	the	situated	possibilities	of	well-
being,	it’s	health	as	it	were,	rather	than	diminishing	or	endangering	these	possibilities.		
	
This	 is	 important,	 since	 precarious	 selves	 express	 the	 vulnerability	 and	 fragility	 of	
caring	 relations	 that	 require	 a	 shift	 towards	 (often)	 unacquainted	 forms	 of	 care.	
Precarious	selves	should	not	only	be	understood	as	 in	need	of	human	help	and/or	
medical	 and	 technological	 assistance.	 Rather,	 precarious	 selves	 become	
cosmopolitical	actors	as	well	(Schillmeier,	2014):	They	demand	a	changing	relation	of	
care,	practices	and	environments	(inner	and	outer)	to	meet	the	requirements	and	to	
live	well	with	it.	As	cosmopolitical	actors,	precarious	selves	question,	disrupt	and	alter	
the	 common,	 normal	 and	 taken-for-granted	 –	 be	 it	 biographical,	 physical,	mental,	
institutional	as	well	as	their	diverse	interlinking.	As	cosmopolitical	agents,	precarious	
selves	bring	to	the	fore	the	question	of	care	and	address	the	differences	and	limits	of	
how	 care	 was	 experienced	 and	 practiced	 so	 far.	 Cosmopolitical	 actors	 unfold	 a	
learning	situation	for	all	the	actors	involved	and	require	the	ars	inveniendi	of	care	that	
is	attentive	to	the	relational	demands	and	obligations.		
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Caring	with	Precarious	Technologies	
Care	practices	include	members	of	the	family	and	relatives,	charities,	voluntary	carers	
and	 care	 professionals,	 different	 expertise	 of	 social	 services,	 nurses	 and	 clinicians,	
spiritual	or	religious	companionship,	medicines,	technologies	and	so	on.	Situations	of	
care	bring	to	the	fore	the	different	perspectives	and	practices	of	what	counts	as	care	
(good	and	bad)	and	how	caring	relations	are	engaged,	by	whom	and/or	through	what.	
Let	me	briefly	return	to	Mr	B	to	make	this	point	clearer.	According	to	Mr	B,	his	happiest	
time	lasted	for	ten	years	to	the	moment	when	his	life	took	another	dramatic	turn:	Mr	
B	suffered	from	a	second	stroke.	Mr	B	is	now	in	his	early	eighties	and	the	second	stroke	
has	paralysed	half	of	his	body.	Caring	about	his	everyday	life	involved	the	assistance	
of	a	nurse	and	his	wife.	As	mentioned	above,	to	care	about	Mr	B	became	too	much	of	
a	burden	for	the	nurse	and	especially	for	his	wife.	When	Mrs	B	suffered	from	a	slip	
disc	while	helping	Mr	B	out	of	bed,	Mr	B	decided	to	move	into	a	nursing	home.	Caring	
about	Mr	 B	 at	 home	 turned	 into	 an	 involuntarily	 ‘careless’	 and	 thus	 problematic	
situation	for	his	wife.	Mr	B	was	adamant	that	his	wife	–	also	in	her	eighties	–	needed	
to	take	more	care	of	herself	as	well.	The	last	thing	she	should	experience	are	health	
issues	from	caring	for	him!		
The	nursing	home	provided	not	an	ideal	situation,	but	a	possible	alternative	to	Mr	B’s	
flat,	 since	 it	was	equipped	with	specialized	caring	 facilities,	professional	assistance,	
medical	care	and	so	on.	Moreover,	his	wife	would	be	able	to	care	for	him	by	visiting	
him	whenever	she	felt	like.	Supplying	him	with	good	honey,	self-made	food	and	a	good	
spirit	kept	him	connected	to	his	former	lived	home.	Occasionally,	Mr	B	also	managed	
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to	care	about	the	ward	with	his	singing	group	and	regularly	lightened	up	the	everyday	
ward	life	with	his	humorous	and	lively	being	(cf.	Schillmeier,	2014).		
At	the	same	time	though	Mr	B’s	bodily	agility	and	strength	deteriorated	and	caring	
became	more	demanding,	troublesome,	and	increasingly	unsatisfying	for	everybody	
involved.	A	body	lifter	entered	the	caring	routines	to	ease	the	everyday	bodily	care,	
both	 for	Mr	B	and	the	nurses.	Using	 the	 lifter,	 the	nurses	where	able	 to	wash	and	
cream	and	properly	 look	after	Mr	B’s	body.	Moreover,	 the	nurses	could	take	more	
care	about	their	own	body,	which	could	be	easily	hurt	by	lifting	heavy	bodies	like	Mr	
B’s:	The	lifter	assisted	Mr	B	to	elevate	himself	from	a	lying	into	a	sitting	or	standing	
position.	The	 lifter	was	designed	that	 the	patient	needs	to	engage	with	 it	 to	do	 its	
caring	job	in	a	satisfactory	manner.	In	that	sense,	the	lifter	contributed	to	a	distributed	
situation	of	care	in	which	both	the	nurses	and	Mr	B	could	care	––although	in	highly	
specific	and	different	ways.		
After	a	while	though	Mr	B’s	body	became	too	frail	to	contribute	to	the	daily	washing	
routines	and	the	nurses	decided	to	use	a	differently	designed	lifter.	The	second	lifter	
allowed	 lifting	Mr	 B	 from	 a	 lying	 position	without	 his	 assistance.	 Shortly	 after	 the	
second	lifter	was	introduced,	Mr	B	began	to	dislike	the	new	lifter,	he	screamed	and	
resisted	 to	be	moved	by	 it.	 The	nurses	 felt	 that	 they	had	no	other	option	 than	 to	
reintroduce	the	first	lifter,	which	in	turn	eased	some	of	Mr	B’s	discomforts.	However,	
it	didn’t	improve	the	overall	caring	situation	neither	for	the	nurses	nor	for	Mr	B.	Mr	
B’s	body	was	too	weak	to	contribute	to	the	successful	and	satisfactory	use	of	the	first	
lifter	and	the	intentions	of	good	care	related	to	it.	Consequently,	the	second	lifter	was	
re-introduced.		
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What	 becomes	 apparent	 from	 the	 brief	 insights	 into	 the	 shifting	 use	 of	 different	
technologies	 of	 care	 is	 the	 importance	 of	 companionship	 –	 both	 human	 and	
nonhuman.	A	 cosmopolitical	 perspective	 as	outlined	 in	 this	 chapter	 revaluates	 the	
importance	 of	 nonhumans	 and	 technologies	 as	matters	 of	 care.	 It	 is	 precisely	 the	
specificity	of	modern	everyday	human	care	by	and	through	which	technologies	play	a	
significant	 role.	 To	 be	 sure,	 technologies	 of	 care	 are	 not	 neutral	 objects.	 They	 are	
designed	for	a	highly	specific	caring	relation	and	thus	enrol	humans	in	highly	particular	
practices.	These	technologies	may	also	contribute	to	bad	care	when	they	do	not	fit	
the	 bodily	 requirements	 the	 caring	 situation	 demands.	 And	 this	 is	 precisely	 what	
makes	a	caring	situation	like	Mr	B’s	so	complex,	precarious	and	contingent.	It	involves	
caring	 relations	 that	 reflect	 (and	 enact)	 the	 limits	 of	 possibilities	 of	 good	 care	 in	
practice.	As	Mr	B’s	shifting	situation	intimately	tells,	caring	becomes	more	demanding	
the	more	 his	 body	 asked	 for	 caring	 practices	 for	which	 no	 satisfying	 solution	was	
available	to	appraise	the	situation	and	learn	to	be	affected	by	it.		
	
Dementia	and	Self-Care		
With	her	focus	on	people	with	diabetes	Anne-Marie	Mol’s	logic	of	care	offers	a	rich	
account	 of	 care	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 ‘tinkering’	 and	 ‘doctoring’	 to	 re-compose	 caring	
relations	(Mol	2008).	Mol	highlights	that	different	illnesses	afford	different	forms	of	
care	practices.	Whereas	‘people	with	diabetes	engage	in	an	impressive	amount	of	self-
care,	[but]	people	with	dementia	do	not’,	so	Mol	(Mol	2008:	104).	I	fully	agree	with	
Mol	 that	 care	differs	 concerning	what	kind	of	 illness	 is	experienced,	who	practices	
care,	when	and	where.	The	notion	of	situated	care	that	I	advocate	here,	fully	endorses	
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such	a	reading	(cf.	Schillmeier	2014).	Having	said	this,	it	seems	a	bit	hasty	to	suggest	
that	the	difference	between	distinctive	illnesses	decide	whether	people	engage	in	self-
care	 or	 not.	 Without	 doubt,	 there	 are	 significant	 differences	 of	 how	 people	 with	
diabetes	and	dementia	participate	in	care.	And	it	is	one	of	the	long-term	effects	of	the	
process	of	dementia	that	the	possibilities	of	self-care	are	shrinking.	One	of	the	reasons	
for	 lacking	self-care	 is	that	we	know	little	about	dementia.	We	have	also	not	many	
‘techniques	of	care’	that	people	with	dementia	would	be	able	to	engage	in	and	care	
for.	To	be	sure,	I	am	not	suggesting	that	self-care	is	a	fixed	capability	irrespectively	of	
the	illness	experienced.	What	I	try	to	highlight	though	is	that	people	with	dementia	
may	 engage	 quite	 intimately	 in	 self-care.	 What	 differs	 though	 is	 how	 self-care	 is	
expressed	and	practiced.		
Let’s	meet	Mrs	M,	a	woman	in	her	seventies	who	lives	in	nursing	home	and	has	been	
diagnosed	with	Alzheimer’s	Disease.	Mrs	M	is	the	central	character	in	an	ethnographic	
film	‘Der	Tag	der	in	der	Handtasche	verschwand’	[‘The	day	that	got	lost	in	a	handbag’]	
by	Marion	Kainz,	which	I	have	analysed	in	some	detail	elsewhere	(cf.	Schillmeier	2014).	
What	 makes	 the	 award-winning	 film	 so	 interesting	 is	 precisely	 the	 careful	 video-
ethnographic	 engagement	 with	 Mrs	 M	 that	 documents	 her	 struggles	 in	 an	 often	
unknown	and	uncanny	world.	The	intimate	portrayal	of	Mrs	M	brings	us	closer	what	
it	may	mean	 to	 dwell	 in	 ontological	 insecurity,	 but	 it	 also	 sheds	 light	 on	Mrs	M’s	
attempts	to	regain	a	sense	of	meaningful	be/coming	(with	others).	At	the	same	time,	
it	is	an	intensive	documentation	of	the	demanding	and	shifting	relations	of	dementia	
and	institutionalized	forms	of	care,	its	rare	successes	and	its	dramatic	failures.				
Scene	15:	Mrs	M	walks	along	the	corridor	and	talks	to	Marion	Kainz,	the	filmmaker		
	 					(19:26).	
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Mrs	M.		 Well,	 these	 are	messy	 [schweinige]	 things,	 you	 know,	which	 I	 don’t	
	 	 like.	
	
Mrs	Kainz:		 What	do	you	mean	[Was	denn]?	
	
Mrs	M:			 Well,	all	that,	…	the	whole…	the	whole.	
	
Mrs	Kainz:		 The	house	here?	Or	what	do	you	mean?		
	
Mrs	M:		 No,	 generally	…	You	 cannot	 change	 that.	 You	must	 take	 it,	 as	 it	 not	
	 	 and	not…	You	must	take	it	as	they	offer	it	(Pause).	
	
Mrs	Kainz:		 Mmh.	
	
Mrs	M:			 If	you	would	get	something	like	that,	would	you	then	feel	good?		
Mrs	Kainz:		 I	don’t	think	so.		
	
Scene	27:		 Mrs	M	(with	Mrs	Kainz)	on	her	way	to	the	working	space		 	
	 	 [‘Arbeitshaus’],	where	Mrs	M	can	help	e.g.	in	the	kitchen	(35:53).	
	
Mrs	M:		 Wasn’t	there,	just	above,	a	cry,	haven’t	you	heard	it?		
	
Mrs	Kainz:		 Sometimes,	here,	people	shout,	yes,	(Pause)	but	they	do	no	harm.		
	
Mrs	M			 Yes,	…	now	we	are	trapped.	Now	we	cannot	get	out	downstairs,	they	
won’t	 let	us	 leave.	(Mrs	M	and	Mrs	Kainz	approach	an	elevator).	Did	
you	now	push	here?				
	
Mrs	Kainz		 Mmh.	
	
Mrs	M			 Now	we	cannot	get	out	of	here.		
	
Mrs	Kainz		 You	must	pass	through	the	glass	door.		
	
Mrs	M			 How	do	you	know	all	these	things?		
	
Mrs	Kianz		 Since	I	have	been	here	already.	
	
Mrs	M			 It	is	closed.	
	
Mrs	Kainz	 You	must	push,	…	or	pull,	no,	like	this	...	The	door	is	hard	to		
	 	 open	(Pause)	Do	you	know	where	you	are?				
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Mrs	M			 Yes,	…	in	the	workhouse,	aren’t	we?		
	
Mrs	Kainz	 Somewhere	like	that,	yes.	But	you	know	this	here?	You	have	already	
	 	 seen	it.				
	
Mrs	M			 seen,	yes	…	but	not	so	intensely.		
	
Mrs	M,	who	often	forgets	that	she	is	in	nursing	home,	frequently	feels	‘out	of	place’	
and	realizes	that	the	whole	situation	doesn’t	feel	right.	Mrs	M	is	agitated,	nervous	and	
‘all	over	the	place’	when	she	is	not	able	to	connect	with	her	body	and	environment	in	
a	meaningful	way.	She	feels	lost	and	is	concerned	about	all	the	messy	[schweinigen]	
situations.	Mrs	M	 is	 not	 only	 concerned	with	 the	 nursing	 home	 and	 how	 they	 do	
things.	 Experiencing	 these	 dementing	 moments,	 it	 worries	 her	 that	 the	 ‘whole’	
situation	makes	her	so	uneasy.	In	the	dementing	situation,	she	feels	lost	in	between	
strange	practices,	 oddly	behaving	people	 and	uncanny	 things	of	 an	 intensively	 felt	
everyday	life.	Affected	by	these	‘demented’	others	and	things	her	existence	is	felt	as	
deeply	troubled.		
	
Mrs	M	goes	in	and	out	of	these	dementing	moments.	Sometimes	she	is	rather	happy	
with	 herself	 and	 her	 environment,	 she	 remembers	 things,	 tells	 stories	 about	 her	
family,	she	wants	to	see	her	old	home,	she	enjoys	talking	about	flowers,	which	have	
been	her	professional	passion	for	many	years.	In	other	situations,	bodies	and	things	
are	mixed	up	and	often	her	relations	of	knowing	and	being	familiar	with	are	lost.	Her	
anxiety	brings	to	the	fore	that	being	with	others	–	human	and	nonhuman	alike	–	has	
no	subjective	meaning	for	her	and	she	feels	that	she	has	no	capabilities	to	do	anything	
to	change	the	uncanny	situation.	She	feels	distressed,	depressed	and	lost	when	the	
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situation	remains	messy,	 full	of	unknowing	people,	 things	and	unfamiliar	practices.	
Quite	often	she	feels	that	the	environment	turns	alien	and	she	feels	utterly	isolated,	
trapped	and	moved	around	by	the	environment.	Frequently,	Mrs	M	feels	left	on	her	
own	and	at	the	mercy	of	an	oppressive	environment.	Confronted	with	a	multitude	of	
faits	acccomplis	(Schillmeier,	2014:	82pp)	Mrs	M	feels	that	she	has	no	possibilities	to	
engage	with	and	to	learn	to	be	affected	by	her	environment	in	positive	ways.	Rather,	
the	very	stubbornness	of	these	accomplished	matters	of	facts	make	her	feel	living	in	
an	 iron	 cage,	 trapped,	 a	 puppet	 of	 and	 for	 others.	 She	 can’t	 contribute,	 can’t	
participate,	can’t	learn	from	and	orient	herself	along	them.		
	
As	Mrs	M	made	 clear,	 she	 has	 seen	 similar	 ‘things’	 before,	 but	 ‘not	 so	 intensely’.	
Although	 intensely	 felt	 she	cannot	positively	 relate	 to	her	environment.	When	she	
feels	 anxious,	 her	 relations	 with	 the	 world	 are	 not	 only	 ‘massive	 and	 vague’	
(Whitehead	1978),	but	she	is	driven	by	negatively	felt	affective	relations	that	do	not	
contribute	to	the	concrescence	of	meaningful	bodies	and	things.	And	yes:	Mrs	M	feels	
unable	to	care	for	the	situation	in	the	way	she	wishes	to.	
	
Throughout	the	dementing	situation,	Mrs	M’s	world	is	uncannily	present.	The	sheer	
presence	of	bodies	and	things	 is	negatively	 felt	and	keeps	bodies	and	things	apart:	
Bodies	 and	 things	 remain	 fully	 present,	 but	 don’t	 protract	 in	 time	 and	 appear	 as	
isolated	and	rather	strange	beings:	coercive,	unknown,	scary,	uncanny,	undisclosed	
Gegenstände.	Massive	and	vague,	 ‘demented’	bodies	and	 things	object	 to	become	
parts	of	a	caring	situation	to	feel	at	home	with.	 In	such	a	situation,	Mrs	M	and	her	
environment	 appear	 as	 ripped	 apart.	 The	 relation	 between	 a	 forgetting	 self	 and	
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merely	present	others	tears	her	apart	from	them	and	from	herself.	Massive	and	vague,	
the	 environment	 becomes	 conspicuously	 present	 as	 doubtful,	 questionable,	
menacing,	oppressive	(cf.	Schillmeier	2014).		
	
Being	 lost	 in	 these	 situations	 drastically	 limits	 the	 possibilities	 of	 living	 well	 and	
positively	 engaging	 with	 these	 situations.	 The	 dementing	 situation	 unfolds	 an	
ontological	crisis,	a	cosmopolitical	event	by	which	Mrs	M’s	world,	her	past,	present	
and	future	and	all	 the	people	and	things	through	which	Mrs	M’s	temporal	being	 is	
materializing,	gets	stuck	in	a	situation	of	the	no	longer	and	not	yet.	Nothing	repeats,	
nothing	gains	time	to	achieve	meaning.	Mrs	M	asks	Mrs	Kainz	how	it	comes	that	she	
knows	all	that	things.	Mrs	Kainz	answers	that	she	knows	since	she	has	already	been	
there.	In	Mrs	Kainz’s	world,	things	and	situations	repeat	more	often.	And	by	repeating	
they	 gain	 some	 continuity,	 they	 gain	 time.	 Repetition	 enables	 a	 learning	 process,	
which	when	remembered,	offers	possibilities	of	gaining	knowledge	and	accomplishing	
a	caring	relation.	In	dementing	situations,	what	repeats	isn’t	remembered	and	often	
remains	unknown,	vague,	meaningless,	uncanny,	frightening.	Enacted	by	ontological	
anxiety,	the	grounding	caring	relation	–	that	unfolds	a	be/coming	with	and	for	others	
–	is	missing.		
	
What	 is	 absent	 is	 a	 referential	 situation,	 an	 oikos,	 i.e.	 an	 eco-logical	 process	 that	
enables	bodies	and	things	to	be/come,	to	be	and	change,	i.e.	to	be	able	to	be	affected	
in	mutual	ways.	Mrs	M	shows	her	awareness	and	concern	 for	 the	missing	 learning	
process.	Indeed,	it	would	be	problematic	to	argue	that	Mrs	M	does	not	engage	in	self-
care.	Quite	on	the	contrary,	it	is	her	questioning,	her	constant	tinkering	with	words	
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that	expresses	one	of	her	remaining	possibilities	to	positively	assemble	with	humans	
(and	non-humans).	With	words,	 she	 tries	 to	 re-gain	a	caring	situation	 in	which	she	
would	be	able	to	animate	her	life	and	her	environment,	i.e.	to	make	them	part	of	a	
living	situation	through	which	she	and	her	environment	gain	meaningful	relations.		
	
The	expression	of	her	bodily	feelings,	her	anxieties	and	her	constant	questioning,	her	
experimenting	with	words	are	existential	modes	of	self-care	which	are	enacted	by	and	
engage	with	the	specificity	of	a	situation	which	is	1)	experienced	as	massive	and	vague,	
and	2)	alludes	to	the	questionability	of	the	general,	the	whole	of	the	situation.	It	is	the	
dementing	moment,	which	affects	the	erasure	of	the	specificities	of	Mrs	M’s	life	and	
unfolds	the	questionability	of	the	general.	Massive	and	vague,	everything	–	humans,	
non-humans,	practices,	perceptions	–	becomes	a	source	of	uncertainty	and	concern	
due	to	their	‘stubbornness’	to	refuse	becoming	part	of	a	caring	situation.	Without	a	
caring	situation,	the	very	subjectivity	of	bodies	and	things	miss	their	soul,	they	appear	
nameless	since	they	lack	their	thread	of	life,	their	caring	biography,	their	constituting	
world,	 their	 positive	 subjective	 feelings,	 their	 possibilities.	 The	 philosopher	 A.N.	
Whitehead	writes	on	the	importance	of	the	soul	and	personal	identity:		
	
	 [I]n	conceiving	our	personal	identity	we	are	apt	to	emphasize	rather	the	soul	
	 than	 the	 body.	 The	 one	 individual	 is	 that	 coordinated	 stream	 of	 personal	
	 experiences,	 which	 is	 my	 thread	 of	 life	 or	 your	 thread	 of	 life.	 It	 is	 that	
	 succession	of	self-realization,	each	occasion	with	its	direct	memory	of	its	past	
	 and	with	its	anticipation	of	the	future.	That	claim	to	enduring	self-identity	is	
	 our	 self-assertion	 of	 personal	 identity.	 (…)	 The	 ‘external	 world	 (…)
	 experienced,	is	the	basic	fact	within	those	experiences.	All	the	emotions,	and	
	 purposes,	and	enjoyments,	proper	to	the	individual	existence	of	the	soul	are	
	 21	
	 nothing	other	than	the	soul’s	reactions	to	this	experienced	world	which	 lies	
	 at	 the	base	of	 the	 soul’s	 existence.	 Thus,	 (…)	 the	 experienced	world	 is	 one	
	 complex	 factor	 in	 the	composition	of	many	factors	constituting	the	essence	
	 of	the	soul.	We	can	phrase	this	shortly	by	saying	that	in	one	sense	the	world	
	 is	in	the	soul.	(Whitehead,	1968:	161pp)	
	
Thus,	through	Mrs	M’s	dementing	moments	and	how	she	engages	with	them	brings	
to	the	fore	the	soul’s	existence	as	embodied	matters	of	care.	The	dementing	moment	
make	us	aware	of	the	importance	of	1)	our	bodily	existence,	2)	our	relations	with	other	
bodies	and	things,	and	3)	our	temporal	being	in	the	way	it	gives	significance	to	the	
mediation	of	the	past,	present	and	future.	It	makes	us	aware	that	having	a	soul	refers	
to	a	process	of	mediation,	a	social	process	that	constitutes	the	ongoing	realization	of	
selves	and	others,	of	bodies	and	things.	Without	the	experience	of	caring	relations	
neither	 the	 biographical	 life	 (as	 an	 ongoing	 collective	 achievement),	 nor	 novel	
situations	that	may	become	part	of	Mrs	M,	gain	soulfulness.	The	constituting	worlds	
fade	from	the	souls	of	each	involved	being,	and	the	worlds	become	souls	which	are	
merely	perceived	as	present	bodies.	The	togetherness	of	world,	soul	and	body	is	lost.					
	
Mrs	M’s	dementing	situation	brings	to	the	fore	the	highly	problematic	ontic	as	well	as	
ontological	 status	 of	 merely	 present	 ‘matters	 of	 fact’	 as	 highly	 distressing	 and	
questionable,	 all	 too	 fixed,	 fully	 present	 but	 ‘time-scanty’	 entities	 which	 indeed	
appear	as	soulless.	But,	to	be	sure,	the	point	is	also	that	Mrs	M’s	‘self-care’	is	not	fully	
erased	by	these	soulless	matters	of	fact.	Quite	on	the	contrary,	they	gain	importance	
in	the	way	they	turn	into	matters	of	concern	that	trouble	Mrs	M’s	world.	And	these	
matters	 of	 concern	 are	 translated	 into	 matters	 of	 care	 through	 the	 ways	 Mrs	 M	
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engages	language	to	address	the	questionability	of	these	matters.	To	be	in	language	
unfolds	 a	 very	 specific	 mode	 of	 existence	 that	 achieves	 togetherness,	 which	 may	
prove	to	become	a	way	of	re-member-ing	with	her	body	and	her	environment.	As	one	
mode	of	caring,	dwelling	in	between	the	meaningfulness	of	words,	the	use	of	language	
gains	foremost	importance	in	Mrs	M’s	life	to	possibly	re-associate	with	other	modes	
of	 concern,	 belonging	 and	 caring	 (e.g.	 being	 in	 soulful	 relations	with	 humans	 and	
things).		
	
	
Repetition,	Care	and	its	Failures	
	
	
Scene	25:		 A	member	of	staff	(MoS)	asks	Mrs	M	(who	formerly	worked	as	a	florist)	
to	help	him	to	tie	a	bouquet	(32:06)	
	
MoS:		 	 Isn’t	that	a	bouquet?		
Mrs	M:		 Yes,	(…)	They	are	nicely	fresh.		
MoS:		 	 Smell	them!		
Mrs	M:		 Mmmh.	
MoS:		 	 Yes,	are	they	fragrant?		
Mrs	M:		 They	are	fragrant,	yes.		
MoS:		 	 I	would	like	to	give	you	pleasure	[Ich	wollte	Ihnen	ja`	ne	Freude		
	 	 bereiten]	
Mrs	M:		 Yes.	
MoS:		 	 I	know,	that	you	like	flowers.		
Mrs	M:		 Mmh…	
MoS:		 	 But	I	am	so	utterly	uncreative,	I	have	absolutely	no	clue.	I	don’t		
	 	 know	how	to	deal	with	it.	Can	you	help	me	tying	a	bouquet?	Can		
	 	 you	show	me,	how	it	works?		
Mrs	M:		 I	am	not	in	favour	of	it	[Ich	bin	nicht	dafür].	
MoS:		 	 No?	Well,	last	time	though	you	showed	me	beautifully	how	to	do	it		
Mrs	M:		 Well,	you	see!	
MoS		 	(He	goes	to	the	en	suite	bath)	I	am	back	in	a	second;	I	am	just	getting	
us	a	vase.	
Mrs	M:		 (while	MoS	is	in	the	bath)	He	drives	me	up	the	wall	(Pause)		
MoS:		 	 (back)	I	am	so	very	clumsy.	Are	these	roses?		
Mrs	M:		 This	is	a	rose,	the	one	you	are	holding	in	your	hands.		
MoS:		 	 This	is	a	rose.	It	is	a	specific	rose?	Since	it	is	a	bit	pale	at	the	bottom,	
	 	 or	is	it	normal?		
Mrs	M:		 This	is	normal.		
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MoS:		 	 This	is	normal.	…	And	what	kind	of	flower	is	this?		
Mrs	M:		 I	don’t	know.	…	A	yellow	flower.		
SoS:		 	 And	it	smells	nicely!		
Mrs	M:		 Doesn’t	smell	at	all.	
MoS:		 	 So	where	would	you	like	to	start?		
Mrs	M:		 Nowhere,	 with,	 with	 nothing.	 I	 want	 to	 know	 nothing	 about	 these	
flowers.	Nothing.	Nothing.	Leave.	I	have	enough	…		I	have	had	it	today.			
MoS:		 	 Yes.	
Mrs	M:		 I	am	of	no	use	[Bin	nicht	zu	gebrauchen].	No,	well	go,	go,	I	am	sick	and	
tired	of	the	blather.	Leave	now!			
	
All	the	attempts	of	the	member	of	staff	to	repeat	a	situation	in/through	which	Mrs	M	
would	be	able	 to	 interact	with	 and	 re-assemble	her	past	 (as	 a	 florist)	 dramatically	
failed.	The	idea	to	engage	in	a	caring	relation	proved	impossible.	On	one	hand,	Mrs	
M,	we	may	say,	resisted	complying	with	a	sheer	repetitive	act.	She	had	no	concern	for	
the	member	of	staff	and	his	caring	attempts.	On	the	other,	one	may	also	argue	that	
the	member	of	staff	didn’t	give	much	attention	to	Mrs	M	mood	and	the	sensitive	and	
precarious	situation	she	was	in.	One	may	say	that	he	acted	rather	careless	and	Mrs	M	
disliked	his	way	of	‘superficial’	engagement.	Having	said	this,	the	member	of	staff	may	
also	be	acquainted	with	a	situation	like	this	and	may	had	expected	that	Mrs	M	may	
change	her	mind	and	will	contribute	to	his	caring	ambitions.	The	situation,	however,	
had	a	quite	dramatic	ending	with	Mrs	M	asking	the	member	of	staff	to	leave	the	room.	
Mrs	M	was	not	in	the	mood	at	all	for	being	mobilized	to	care	for	the	other’s	caring	
efforts.	Quite	on	 the	contrary,	 it	 seems	 that	Mrs	M	was	bugged	by	 the	 (stubborn)	
attempt	of	the	member	of	staff	to	make	her	do	things	she	didn’t	feel	like	doing.	Mrs	
M	didn’t	feel	to	engage	in	a	staged	situation	that	is	not	hers,	to	make	her	smell	flowers	
which	do	not	smell,	to	listen	to	his	idle	talk	to	make	her	become	the	florist	again,	and	
so	forth.	It	seems	that	Mrs	M	feels	that	she	is	unable	to	care	about	flowers	in	the	way	
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the	member	of	staff	wishes	for.	She	was	asked	to	be	creative,	to	use	her	florist	hands	
and	 thus	 to	 engage	 in	 meaning-	 and	 skilful	 bouquet	 tying	 practices.	 To	 hand-tie	
flowers	wasn’t	of	her	concern,	in	the	situation	flowers	appear	as	mere	matter	of	facts,	
purely	‘flower	facts’,	some	yellow,	some	not,	some	smell	and	some	don’t,	some	have	
a	name	and	some	are	just	flowers,	and	many	flowers	become	one	flower.	All	 in	all,	
just	normal	flowers	but	no	mediators	of	care	as	suggested	by	the	member	of	staff.	
Mrs	M	was	not	in	the	mood	to	repeat	what	she	apparently	did	nicely	the	last	time	and	
what	she	must	have	done	and	liked	for	many	years	of	her	life.		
It	is	not	Mrs	M,	the	former	florist,	who	is	able	to	be	mobilized	by	the	member	of	staff’s	
care	attempts.	His	well-intended	(but	clumsy	and	pushy)	efforts	to	care	about	Mrs	M	
turned	out	to	be	a	source	of	dismissing	care.	Having	said	this,	the	video	doesn’t	reveal	
much	about	Mrs	M’s	day,	what	has	been	on	her	mind	before,	what	has	been	bothering	
her,	what	made	her	feel	 like	she	felt.	What	we	know	though	is	that	she	felt	utterly	
useless,	‘Bin	nicht	zu	gebrauchen’	and	like	Melville’s	Bartleby	she	preferred	not	to	be	
mobilized	 by	 caring	 others	 and	 their	 practices.	 Bin	 nicht	 zu	 gebrauchen	 literally	
translates	as	‘I	am	of	no	use’.	It	offers	a	double	meaning.	On	the	one	hand,	it	seems	
to	express	that	Mrs	M	lacked	power	to	enrol	in	that	situation	and	on	the	other	it	stated	
the	firm	proposition	that	others	must	not	enrol	her	into	that	situation.		She	is	nicht	zu	
gebrauchen	and	nothing	and	nobody	could	enrich	the	situation.	No	giving,	no	taking.	
Her	Befindlichkeit	[mood,	affectivity]	didn’t	allow	that	flowers	(or	the	member	of	staff)	
become	part	of	an	enjoyable	 interaction.	The	caring	situation	that	was	 intended	to	
give	Mrs	M	a	treat,	i.e.	the	repetition	of	something	that	has	been	experienced	as	good	
in	the	past,	dramatically	failed.	The	member	of	staff	also	failed	to	give	more	attention	
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to	the	intense	situation	to	which	he	undoubtingly	contributed.	It	is	precisely	the	caring	
relation	that	could	not	be	established	and	it	is	the	situation	that	asked	for	a	dramatic	
change	 of	 how	 to	 care	 about	 it.	 The	 staged	 caring	 situation	made	 no	 sense,	 since	
neither	 the	 good	 past,	 nor	 the	 actual	 or	 the	 expected	meanings	 of	 care	 could	 be	
established.	Neither	Mrs	M	nor	the	member	of	staff	did	‘benefit’	from	the	situation.	
None	of	the	modes	of	temporal	engagement,	the	remembering	of	the	(good)	past,	the	
composition	 of	 the	 present,	 or	 the	 proposition	 [Vorhaben]	 of	 the	 intended	 caring	
project	have	worked	out.	One	may	say	that	the	process	of	shifting	the	process	of	a	
matter	of	fact	of	everyday	caring	towards	a	matter	of	concern	for	the	situation	and	
subsequently	 towards	 a	matter	of	 situated	 care	has	 failed.	 The	emerging	 situation	
didn’t	allow	Mrs	M	or	the	member	of	staff	to	gain	a	sense	of	care:	none	of	the	two	
has	 viz.	 is	 partaking	 in	 a	 caring	 relation	 that	 would	 enact	 hesitation	 and	 the	
possibilities	of	doing	things	differently.	My	reading	of	the	video	footage	sustains	Mol’s	
argument	that	‘in	the	logic	of	care	the	good,	better,	worse	does	not	precede	practice	
but	is	part	of	it’	(Mol	2008:	87)	and	that	‘the	good’	cannot	be	taken	for	granted.	If	the	
caring	situation	becomes	better	or	worse	throughout	the	process	of	caring	remains	an	
open	 empirical	 question	 that	 unfold	 the	 situated	 care	 practices	 from	 which	 the	
requirements	of	and	for	good	care	in	practice	emerge.		
	
Situated	Care	and	Policy	Making		
Following	from	the	brief	discussion	of	Mr	B’s	and	Mrs	M’s	shifting	situations	of	care	
one	can	argue	that	to	care	means	to	re-compose	caring	relations	between	bodies	and	
things.	Caring	is	an	open	process	and	often	means	to	engage	in	new	ways	of	caring	
	 26	
that	 are	 attentive	 to	 emerging	 situations	 of	 care	 which	 possibly	 unfold	 changing	
requirements	 and	 obligations	 of	 good	 care	 in	 practice.	 I	 have	 also	 argued	 that	
situations	of	care	are	the	locus	of	wider	societal	changes	which	are	very	much	part	of	
related	health	care	policies.	It	remains	a	significant	feature	of	public	debates	about	
health	care	and	health	care	policies	that	matters	of	care	are	constantly	changing.	As	
we	have	seen	most	recently,	health	care	policies	are	not	exempt	from	contributing	to	
issues	 of	 careless	 health	 practices	 and	 failures	 which	 violate	 the	 requirements	 of	
emerging	health	care	situations	(Francis	2013).		
It	 is	precisely	the	emerging	complexities	of	situated	care	that	names	the	prime	and	
often	unsolved	concern	of	care	policy-making.	We	have	seen	how	current	neo-liberal	
policing	 of	 care	 contribute	 to	 careless	 practices	 if	 situated	 care	 is	 regulated	 by	 an	
economy	of	care	that	favors	standardizing,	measuring,	normalizing	and	economizing	
embodied	care	practices.	The	brief	 insights	 into	 the	caring	 life	of	Mr	B	and	Mrs	M	
revealed	that	recommendations	for	care	policy	are	prone	to	fail	 if	they	maintain	to	
deliver	fixed	packages	of	care.		
Health	care	policies	need	a	careful	design	that	is	sensitive	to	the	shifting	demands	and	
obligations	of	situated	care.	This	means	that	the	‘facticity’	of	the	emerging	situation	
of	care	 itself	should	be	the	starting	point	 for	good	care	policy.	Health	care	policies	
need	to	pay	careful	attention	to	the	ways	the	involved	actors	do	care.	It	requires	a	
mapping	 of	 the	 different	 concerns	 and	 care	 practices	 already	 in	 place.	 Good	 care	
demands	a	careful,	i.e.	attentive,	cautious,	gentle,	vigilant	and	meticulous	tracing	how	
the	practices	of	self-care	and	the	caring	and	concerns	for	others	fold	the	situation	in	
place	and	provide	evidence	of	and	for	care.	What	has	been	proved	as	good	care	so	far,	
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which	entities	have	been	 involved	and	how	have	 they	been	contributing	and	what	
makes	 the	 shifting	 situation	 in	 need	 of	 care?	 This	 is	 a	 demanding	 process	 since	 it	
requires	a	learning	process	of	getting	affected	by	a	situation	that	questions,	disrupts	
and	alters	what	has	been	taken	for	granted	as	caring	relations.		
To	care	well	means	to	look	after	the	process	of	differing	and	only	through	being	with	
others	–	human	non-human	alike	–	differences	gain	a	hold,	i.e.	make	a	difference.	It	is	
precisely	the	unruly	and	often	unacquainted	processes	of	how	differences	occur	which	
unfold	the	time-spaces	of	care,	time-spaces	of	learning	to	get	affected	by	the	process	
of	 embodied	 differentiation.	 It	 is	 the	 cosmopolitics	 of	 situated	 care	 and	 its	
requirements	 that	 address	 the	 questionability	 of	 normalized	 and	 normalizing	
embodied	 and	 material	 relations.	 Paraphrasing	 A.N.	 Whitehead	 (1968)	 and	 M.	
Heidegger	(1962),	it	is	the	shifting	worlding	[das	Welten]	that	characterise	the	souls	
of	 situations	 of	 care.	 And	 it	 is	 precisely	 the	 attentiveness	 to	 the	worlding	 souls	 of	
caring	relations	that	are	crucial	in	providing	good	care	in	practice.	An	understanding	
of	care	as	situated	worlds	in	the	making	may	have	an	impact	in	rethinking	(health)	care	
policy	processes	and	may	offer	new	collaborations	between	researching,	policing	and	
improving	health	care	practices.	
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